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Abstract 
The terrorist attacks of September 
11, 2001 fundamentally reprioritized US 
foreign policy. In this environment the Bush 
administration crafted what came to be 
known as the Bush Doctrine. Though a pre-
cise definition of the Bush Doctrine remains 
contested, definitions typically include the 
idea that the United States may preemp-
tively attack countries harboring terrorists, 
and that the US should support the spread of 
democracy. But, after eight years, the 
United States is not safer. This paper ana-
lyzes democratization as a theory and as an 
element of the Bush Doctrine through case 
studies of Iraq and Afghanistan. By tying 
the notion of victory in the War on Terror to 
democratization, the United States has an-
gered many Afghanis and Iraqis, wasted an 
enormous amount of resources, and dam-
aged its relations with other countries. Over-
all, efforts by the Bush administration to 
impose democracy in these countries have 
counterproductive at combating terrorism.  I 
conclude with policy prescriptions for the 
Obama administration, namely that America 
must remove itself from the political proc-
esses of Iraq and Afghanistan, rebuild ties 
with the international community, and de-
velop a strategy for complete American 
withdrawal from these areas. 
 
 
Since September 11, 2001 terrorism 
has been a chief concern of American na-
tional security. The days of US protection 
from foreign threats because of its geogra-
phy are long gone. Al Qaeda displayed not 
only its ability to attack the United States, 
but that it was capable of doing so from 
American soil.  From lone snipers to an-
thrax delivered through the mail, Americans 
became acutely aware of the potential for 
additional terrorist attacks. Fortunately, 
many experts agree that terrorists generally 
lack the logistical capabilities necessary to 
inflict mass casualties. Unfortunately, ter-
rorists are constantly working to overcome 
these obstacles.  Instead of conducting gran-
diose attacks, terrorists may use smaller, 
inexpensive strikes that require low levels 
of technical expertise and training.  Regret-
tably, states (especially liberal democracies 
like the United States) have great difficulty 
countering this approach toward violence. 
States are bound by international norms and 
laws.  Democracies like the United States 
are further constrained in the application of 
violence and surveillance in counterterror-
ism by popular consent.  Given the ability of 
terrorist organizations to adapt and over-
come state defenses, alternative methods are 
needed for states to preserve their national 
security from terrorist attacks.  
In this environment, the Bush ad-
ministration crafted what would later  
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 become known as the Bush Doc-
trine.  Although the precise defini-
tion of the Bush Doctrine is still in 
dispute, definitions typically include 
legitimizing preemptive strikes against 
perceived aggressors and using United 
States—supported democratization as a 
weapon in the “War on Terror” (for exam-
ple, see Monten 2005). American backed 
democratization is a particularly interesting 
element of the War on Terror because it was 
a subtle tool capable of changing both gov-
ernment and citizenry. However, despite at-
tempts by the Bush administration to use 
democratization to further its foreign policy 
agenda of eliminating terrorism, democrati-
zation in Iraq and Afghanistan has proved 
disastrous.  In this paper, I will show how 
despite rational theoretical backing, prob-
lems resulting from the pledge to democra-
tize Iraq and Afghanistan have greatly di-
minished America’s capability to wage the 
War on Terror. 
Definitions and Terms 
For this study, it is important that the 
language used be a clear as possible.  Thus, 
for the purpose of this essay, I must define 
several words.  Essential to my argument is 
democratization.   For this term, I borrow a 
definition from Edward Mansfield and Jack 
Snyder’s book Electing to Fight.  To democ-
ratize is to, “try to create favorable institu-
tional conditions in the sequence most likely 
to foster successful, peaceful democratic 
transitions” (2007, 16). This definition is 
exceptional because it identifies the essence 
of democracy (governance with popular sov-
ereignty rested in the will of the people); 
but, does not necessitate a successful transi-
tion to democracy.  This is important be-
cause, despite best intentions, there is no 
guarantee that democratization will actually 
result in the formation of a democratic state.  
This is very logical. Since it is impossible to 
predict the future, how can a reasonable 
definition of democratization be contingent 
on the emergence of a democratic state?  
Additionally, within the span of human his-
tory, no state is eternal. While the United 
States has been a relatively stable democracy 
for over the past 150 years, there is no guar-
antee that autocracy will not prevail in 100 
years.  It would be unfair to discount the 
long history of American democracy be-
cause of the potential emergence of an auto-
cratic state in the future. The central argu-
ment of this paper regards the problems as-
sociated with continued American presence 
in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Thus, to under-
stand the motivations for continuous Ameri-
can involvement in these two countries, it is 
vital to perceive democratization as a proc-
ess rather than a result. 
War on Terror is the next important 
term to define.  War on Terrorism, Global 
War on Terrorism, War on Terror, and ter-
rorist are terms that were widely used by the 
Bush administration to describe and define 
its counterterrorist activities since 9-11.  One 
of the largest obstacles to any serious study 
of US policy since this time has been the 
disambiguation of such confusing language. 
Discouragingly, the Bush administration 
made no effort to clarify its terms.  In fact, in 
the case of prisoner detentions at Abu 
Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay, the Bush ad-
ministration intentionally obfuscated these 
terms to provide leeway in gathering intelli-
gence (Hersh 2004, 264).   Thus, since the 
Bush administration has not identified  
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 precise definitions, we must there-
fore look towards a practical usage.  
For this paper, I adapt Bruce Hoff-
man’s definition and define terrorism as 
any attack conducted by a substate actor 
with the intent to cause fear in a given 
population achieve as an end (Hoffman 
2006, 33). A “terrorist” is any person who 
commits an act of terrorism.  Finally, terror 
is an emotion that can be evoked through 
acts of terrorism. 
The decision to limit terrorism to the 
attacks of substate actors is very intentional.  
Admittedly, this is a hotly debated topic in 
the field of counterterrorism.  Many argue 
some states have intentionally attacked civil-
ians with the intention of instilling fear just 
like a substate actor would. Proponents of 
this belief might argue that actions by Nazis 
in concentration camps during the Holocaust 
should be considered terrorism just like the 
actions of the 9-11 hijackers; all human suf-
fering caused by terrorism is equal. Thus, 
some might perceive separation between 
state—sponsored terrorism and substate ter-
rorism, as unnecessary, ultimately reducing 
the effectiveness of counterterrorism at com-
bating human suffering. However, allowing 
state sponsored terrorism into this discussion 
will becloud the topic at hand.  The states of 
interest in my investigation are Afghanistan 
and Iraq.  Prior to the American invasion in 
these countries, governments were brutally 
authoritarian.  Both states would frequently 
commit horrible acts against citizens with 
the intent of inciting fear.  Thus, the two 
groups must be separated if only to distin-
guish the actions of the former Iraqi and Af-
ghani regimes from the actions of current 
substate groups currently in these countries.  
 Obviously Global War on Terror-
ism, and the War on Terrorism do not con-
note the same thing.  Furthermore, neither of 
these terms act45ually describes American 
counterterrorist policy since September 11, 
2001. To be at war with terrorism is to be at 
war with an action.  In this sense, an analo-
gous policy to the War on Terrorism is the 
equally ineptly named American War on Il-
legal Immigration.  Both illegal immigration 
and terrorism are abstract concepts.  Al-
though one might be able to identify a perpe-
trator of terrorism just as one may be able to 
identify an illegal immigrant, it is impossible 
to single out illegal immigration or terror-
ism.  Because it is intangible, terrorism can-
not be fought on a battlefield. One could at-
tack terrorism insofar as the causes of terror-
ism could be eliminated, but attacking ter-
rorism itself does not really mean anything.  
Because of this, neither of these terms will 
be used in my paper. 
It is worth mentioning that another 
problem with the phrase Global War on Ter-
rorism is that it alludes to US counterterror-
ist activity on a scale that it much larger than 
reality.  America has made no great effort to 
eliminate terrorist movements that do not 
threaten US interests.  For example, US ac-
tivity to destroy the PPK or the Tamil Tigers 
has been notoriously absent from the War. 
Some may argue that this absence is actually 
a tactic in itself (Byman 2009, 472).  By not 
going to war against all terrorism every-
where, the United States is less likely to 
draw the ire of terrorist groups that might 
otherwise have left America alone. Really, 
the War on Terror is with the terrorists who 
seek to harm to the United States.  For all 
these reasons, Global War on Terror is an 
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 inappropriate term to describe U.S. 
policy since 9-11.  
I argue that War on Terror is the 
most suitable term to describe current 
US action.  First, War on terror elimi-
nates ambiguity in distinguishing between 
a terrorist and a freedom fighter who em-
ploys terrorism. It treats both of these groups 
the same.  So long as a person uses terror to 
advance his agenda he is a terrorist and may 
be attacked by the United States.  Further-
more, war on terror does not imply intent to 
eliminate terrorism itself.  This is a neces-
sary element in any description of current 
US counterterrorist policy since terrorism, as 
was just discussed, is virtually impossible to 
eliminate.   
I would be remiss to ignore the re-
cent change in recent policy changes made 
by the Obama administration regarding ter-
minology.  In March 2009, the Obama ad-
ministration stated it was removing the term 
Global War on Terrorism and all similar 
terms from the lexicon of United States for-
eign policy (Baker 2009).  Interestingly, the 
phrase chosen to replace War on Terror is 
Overseas Contingency Operation.   Such a 
gesture was certainly intended to eliminate 
the implication that the United States is at 
war with Islam, and to break from the un-
ending dedication of American resources to 
counterterrorism.  As will be discussed later, 
I can certainly agree with these goals.  How-
ever, the new term the Obama administra-
tion has chosen is not particularly good ei-
ther. Breaking down the phrase, the first 
word is rather misleading.  While it may be 
true that many of the fronts in the War on 
Terror are across the ocean, this is certainly 
not always the case.  The idea to form the 
Department of Homeland Security, was cre-
ated immediately following 9-11, and was 
intended to “create a comprehensive and 
shared” national vision for the purpose of 
“defeating terrorism” (Office of Homeland 
Security 2002, i).  The Bush administration 
correctly viewed the need for both domestic 
and international efforts to eliminate terror-
ism.  By renaming the War on Terror as an 
overseas activity, appreciation for the utility 
of a two-pronged approach to fighting terror-
ists may be forgotten.  The word 
“Contingency” is mystifying.  For what ac-
tivity is the exercise of American might 
strength a contingency? Diplomacy against 
terrorist is not an option.  As stated, substate 
actors are less susceptible to the sticks and 
carrots of traditional diplomacy. The only 
word that accurately describes U.S. policy is 
Operation, which is really a meaningless 
term on its own. Since this term does a very 
poor job at actually describing American 
policy, I believe it would be best to continue 
using the term War on Terror. 
American Motivations 
Let us now turn to the reasons for US 
democratization.  After all, there must have 
been some purpose to the efforts that have 
now cost the United States almost $864 bil-
lion (United States Congress Congressional 
Research Service, 16).  A historical ap-
proach is best for understanding current mo-
tives.  Realpolitick has typically guided 
American efforts at regime change (Pie 
Minxin, Amin Samia, and Garz Seth 2006, 
64).   “Only [since the early twentieth cen-
tury has America’s political ideals and its 
need to sustain domestic support for] nation-
building compelled it to try to establish de-
mocratic rule in target nations.” (Pie et al. 
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 2006, 65) To look beyond such 
gross simplifications of US policy 
as, “blood for oil,” the Bush admini-
stration’s motives for invading and de-
mocratizing Iraq and Afghanistan cer-
tainly included security.  Afghanistan had 
been the safe haven for al Qaeda under the 
Taliban.  In fact, al Qaeda underwent much 
of its organizational development in Af-
ghanistan during the 1980s while fighting 
the Soviets.  In what turned out to be a tragic 
irony, much of al Qaeda’s development oc-
curred as a direct result of American arma-
ment and training of mujahedeen during the 
Soviet Invasion (Bhutto 2008, 112-114). As 
al Qaeda was discovered to be the principal 
organizer of the terrorist attacks of Septem-
ber 11, 2001, it was no surprise that the 
United States saw Afghanistan as a major 
battleground in the War on Terror.   
The case of Iraq was a bit more com-
plicated.  Initially, the United States claimed 
that Iraq possessed weapons of mass de-
struction (WMDs) it had acquired through a 
covert weapons development program 
(Galbraith 2006, 70).  Had this been the 
case, Iraq would have been in violation of 
numerous international laws; notably, 
United Nations Security Council Resolu-
tions 687, 678 and 1441 which all explicitly 
forbade Iraq from possessing or developing 
WMDs after the 1991 Gulf War.  This 
breach of international law is obviously seri-
ous, but even if Iraq had possessed such 
weapons, it lacked the delivery system nec-
essary to attack the U.S such as interconti-
nental ballistic missiles.   
Nevertheless, the Bush administra-
tion argues that the Iraqi government under 
Saddam Hussein had the potential for selling 
or distributing WMDs to enemies of Amer-
ica.  Admittedly, this was rather unlikely. 
The secular Arab-nationalist Ba’ath Party 
(Iraq’s governing party) would have been a 
strange bedfellow for the Sunni Islamist al 
Qaeda.  An example of this disconnect is 
exemplified by Osama bin Laden’s offer to 
Saudi King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz al Saud of 
the use of al Qaeda forces to defend Saudi 
Arabia from Iraq during the first Gulf War. 
Although the offer was not accepted, it un-
derscores the acrimonious relationship be-
tween Iraq and al Qaeda. Nevertheless, the 
Bush administration argued that an Iraqi alli-
ance with al Qaeda against the United States 
was possible, thereby exacerbating Ameri-
can fear of terrorism. Given the stakes in 
nuclear conflicts, the fear created by the 
Bush administration was strong enough to 
cull dissent, even from many Democrats in 
Congress (Althaus and Largio 2006, 4).  No 
American wanted to be responsible for op-
posing regime change in Iraq if the connec-
tion between the two groups were true.   
In both cases, United States policy 
was to effect regime change.  The Taliban 
was deposed because of the asylum it 
granted to al Qaeda operative.  Former Iraqi 
President Saddam Hussein, the President of 
a country the United States believed was in 
contravention of international law and con-
spiring with terrorists, was removed from 
power as well.  But once the dust settled af-
ter the invasions, new governments were 
needed for the two countries.  To strengthen 
its national security, the United States 
needed to ensure that any successor govern-
ment would be friendlier towards the United 
States than its predecessor. One possibility 
was for American instillation of a  
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 dictatorship (as had been the hall-
mark of US foreign policy through-
out the Cold War).  However, Ameri-
can officials likely realized the danger 
in empowering dictators in already un-
stable countries particularly given the na-
ture of terrorism.  Arguably, support of dic-
tatorships and authoritarianism was what led 
to the conditions in Afghanistan and Iraq in 
the first place.  Instead, the Bush administra-
tion turned to democratization as the answer 
to its security dilemma. 
 
Forging a Democratic Peace 
In his essay “Perpetual Peace” writ-
ten in 1795, the political philosopher Im-
manuel Kant outlined what he believed 
would be necessary to stop states from going 
to war with one another.  Although the ter-
minology differs slightly between Kant’s 
time and today, he essentially argued for 
three things: that all countries to democra-
tize, that the depth and number of involve-
ments of states in Intergovernmental Organi-
zations (IGOs) increase, and that interna-
tional trade increase (Kant [1795] 1970, 93-
98).  Kant reasoned that democracies only 
tend to go to war in self defense (Kant 
[1795] 1970, 98).  Thus, if all countries were 
democracies, there would be no war. 
A democratic Iraq and Afghanistan 
would certainly not have been the end to all 
war everywhere.  Nevertheless, the Bush 
administration reasoned that if these coun-
tries became democratic, they would absorb 
democratic ideals, and be likely to attack, or 
support attacks perpetrated against, the 
United States (Gause III, 2005).  Of course, 
changing the “hearts and minds” of potential 
terrorist was an important goal. A strictly 
state-focused approach would not necessar-
ily have influenced subgovernmental terror-
ist groups.  Theoretically however, encour-
aging democracy would also help diminish 
the potential for terrorism. The diminished 
potential would be through the growth of 
robust civil societies. The London School of 
Economics provides an excellent definition 
of civil society as, “the arena of uncoerced 
collective action around shared interests, 
purposes and values. Civil society is theo-
retically divorced from activities of the state, 
though in practice, this relationship may be 
negotiated” (London School of Economics, 
2004).  This concept is certainly familiar to 
Americans.  From local religious groups to 
political action groups, Americans partici-
pate in many different manifestations of civil 
society.  Important to this discussion is that 
many groups in civil society seek to effect 
change. Civil society provides a medium 
through which citizens can express discon-
tent with the status quo without resorting to 
violence.  Furthermore, to extrapolate from 
the theories of Ashtoush Varshney, the asso-
ciations created by civil society might even 
help prevent the emergence of violence 
amongst Iraqis.  This was an important con-
sideration because of the deconstructed 
power relationship during the former Hus-
sein regime between ruling Sunni and the 
demographically dominant Shi’a (not to 
mention the Kurds in Northern Iraq. Thus, in 
the aftermath of the Iraq and Afghanistan 
invasions, the United States began reestab-
lishing the two countries as democracies. 
To their credit, the Bush administra-
tion realized some of the serious roadblocks 
to democracy in these two states, and did 
attempt to remove them.  Immediately after 
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 the invasions, the Bush administra-
tion lifted many of its trade barriers 
with Iraq and Afghanistan.  Theoreti-
cally, this enabled more international 
trade for the two countries. Further-
more, the United States brought in the 
Army Corps of Engineers and hired over 
180,000 independent contractors to assist in 
the reconstruction of state infrastructure. As 
of August 2008 this has cost the United 
States Government over $100 billion for 
Iraq alone (United States Congress. Con-
gressional Budget Office 2008, 16).  Ironi-
cally much of the infrastructure had been 
destroyed either as a direct result of Ameri-
can attacks during the invasion or by indige-
nous pillaging immediately following them. 
Assisting in infrastructure projects supported 
the development of business, in turn, pro-
moting international trade.   Furthermore, by 
providing Iraqis with basic amenities, the 
United States was clearly reaching out to the 
Iraqi polity in the hopes that a future elected 
government would not be explicitly anti-
American. 
The situation in Afghanistan was 
even worse than the situation in Iraq.  Larry 
Goodson explains, “After conflict or regime 
change, societies usually require some de-
gree of reconstruction… but the destruction 
in Afghanistan in late 2001 was far beyond 
what is usually encountered in such dis-
rupted societies” (2006, 153).  Because of 
this major issue, the United States relied on 
anti-Taliban groups to establish a process for 
transitioning sovereignty of Afghanistan to a 
freely-elected Afghan government rather 
than a US led coalition force (Goodson 
2006, 157).  This process, as laid out in the 
Bonn Accords, was obviously a pivotal step 
in establishing democracy in Afghanistan.  
Democratic governance is impossible with-
out a democratically elected government.  
By relying on local Afghanis to establish 
democracy, the United States – specifically 
the military – was free to fighting Taliban 
forces in the Afghan countryside. However, 
the lack of benchmarks for successful de-
mocratization combined with the inability of 
the United States to eradicate the Taliban 
from Afghanistan has prolonged the Ameri-
can presence without any end in sight.  
Democratic Peace Theory (DPT) 
may have been a feasible solution for stop-
ping terrorism, so long as it was executed 
properly.  Although invasion and subsequent 
democratization are inherently state-level 
actions, the Bush administration believed 
these methods better than the alternative of 
trying to root out specific terrorist organiza-
tions.  To a degree, they were correct.  It is 
very difficult to completely destroy a terror-
ist group. First, simply finding a group may 
prove problematic.  Obviously, as a subgov-
ernmental group, there is no terrorist “state.” 
Nor is there necessarily a need for one.  
With the advent of high-speed internet and 
the pervasiveness of telecommunications, 
terrorists can live virtually anywhere.  Nev-
ertheless, terrorist groups are attracted to 
weak and failed states such as Afghanistan 
or post-invasion Iraq (Gvosdev and Takeyh. 
2009, 80).  Weak and failed states may ei-
ther be too weak to eliminate terrorists, or 
may even collude with certain organizations.  
This relationship provides terrorists with of-
ficial documentation such as visas for travel, 
and provides a safe haven during the coun-
terterrorist offensives of other countries. 
This was certainly the case for Afghanistan 
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 which, under the Taliban, had 
worked with al Qaeda to train the 
Afghan military from 1997-2001 
(Wright 2006, 355). For countries like 
the United States, the protection af-
forded to terrorist groups in weak and 
failed states from international norms re-
spect state sovereignty can seriously infringe 
on effective counterterrorist campaigns 
(Patrick 2009, 102).  
Another problem for most counter-
terrorist activity is identifying the organiza-
tional structure of terrorist organizations.  
Unlike the hierarchical style of “old terror-
ism,” “new terrorism” is characterized by its 
nodal quality.  Cells operate independently, 
and there is no direct links up or down a 
chain of command.  Lacking the ability to 
link one terrorist to another, it is almost im-
possible to determine the size and leadership 
of a terrorist group.  Furthermore, since the 
cells operate independently, “leadership” 
may even be an antiquated concept in the 
organizational structure of terrorist groups.  
When the United States attacked Afghani-
stan, and killed or capture many of who it 
believed to be top al Qaeda leaders, the 
movement did not die. In fact, as of this 
writing, Taliban forces have conquered 
much of the Swat region, just over the bor-
der in Pakistan. Even with Osama bin Laden 
in hiding, branches of al Qaeda live on and 
continue to fight and recruit.  This resiliency 
combined with other qualities of new terror-
ism such as religious motivations and a de-
sire to maximize casualties calls for a non-
state focused response (Howard 2009, 113). 
Since terrorists do not control states, they 
cannot be dealt with through coercion or 
tribute.  To them, victory is zero-sum. Ad-
mittedly, the very notion of a “new” terror-
ism versus and “old” terrorism is debated.  
However, the characteristics of the terrorists 
fought in the War on Terror resemble “new 
terrorists” rather than “old terrorists.” This is 
why I distinguish between the two groups. 
It was not entirely unreasonable for 
the Bush administration to believe that its 
attempts to democratize Afghanistan and 
Iraq should have been successful.  Since 
WWII America has successfully democra-
tized two states: Japan and West Germany.  
Both of these democracies emerged from 
war-ravaged countries after having been pre-
viously ruled by authoritarian governments. 
Democratization occurred in both places de-
spite a recent cult-of-personality surrounding 
the former leader as well (particularly salient 
for Iraqi reconstruction).  Furthermore, since 
these countries democratized, neither had 
been involved in an international conflict.   
In fact, since WWII, Japan has not devel-
oped an official offensive military (albeit, 
this tradition sprang from provisions estab-
lished in a Constitution drawn up by Ameri-
can military officials (Ike 1950, 24)).  If the 
United States could harness the characteris-
tics of successful democratization in Japan 
and West Germany, perhaps it would be pos-
sible to turn Afghanistan and Iraq into de-
mocracies as well.   
 Taken at face value, the reasons for, 
the Bush administration’s invasions of Iraq 
and Afghanistan are fairly reasonable.  
States, unlike amorphous terrorist groups, 
are easily identifiable and targetable by the 
military.  The services these states provided 
to al Qaeda could be reduced or eliminated 
entirely through regime change. Democrati-
zation, had it been carried out properly, 
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 could have further reduced the po-
tential for terrorism. 
 
The Shortcomings of  
Democratization 
With such a theoretically sound the-
ory for democratization, why has democra-
tization in Iraq and Afghanistan been a hin-
drance to the War on Terror?  The answer is 
lies in how democratization has been shaped 
by political elites to define success in the 
two countries.  In Afghanistan, after the ini-
tial invasion, the United States spent most of 
its time fighting against Taliban in the hills 
of Afghanistan.  The United States correctly 
believed that by creating a secure environ-
ment in Afghanistan, it would be more likely 
that a democratic government could flourish 
(Fukuyama 2006, 234). However, neither the 
safe environment nor democracy ever 
emerged.  To this day that United States 
military continues to fight against Taliban 
and al Qaeda forces throughout Afghanistan.  
The fighting is so intense that in late March 
2009, President Barak Obama ordered an 
additional 17,000 troops to Afghanistan to 
“partner with Afghan security forces and go 
after insurgents along the border” (Obama 
2009). Because of this instability, the Af-
ghan national government has yet to gain 
control over the whole country. Facing inter-
nal insurrection, a burgeoning illegal drug 
trade, and a lack of infrastructure, Afghani-
stan has been unable to develop into the de-
mocracy necessary for DPT to take effect.  
Democracy has become the single criteria 
for victory in Afghanistan.  Unfortunately, it 
has proven elusive.      
As discussed earlier, before the 2003 
invasion of Iraq, the United States used the 
presence of WMDs and the association of 
Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden as a 
casus belli.  So certain was the United States 
that it would encounter weapons of mass 
destruction during the invasion that media 
personnel were imbedded into American 
military squadrons (Galbraith 2006, 86—
87).  However, after the invasion, in an in-
ternational investigation by members of the 
Coalition of the Willing to determine if Sad-
dam Hussein possessed WMDs at the time 
of the invasion.  The report came back nega-
tive (Duelfer 2004). Internationally embar-
rassed and responsible for a failed state, the 
United States began to democratize Iraq.  
Admittedly, Iraq needed reconstruction inde-
pendent of the presence or absence of weap-
ons of mass destruction.  However, for lack 
of any other legitimate reason for the inva-
sion, the U.S. turned to democratization as 
the criteria for success.  Thus, democratiza-
tion, while a theoretically sound means of 
encouraging peace, has become an excuse 
for a continued American presence in Iraq 
and Afghanistan.  It is this continued pres-
ence that has caused serious damage to the 
ability of the United States to wage the War 
on Terror. 
 
The Problems of Continued United States 
Presence 
 
Angry Afghanistan, Infuriated Iraq 
One of the most obvious problems 
resulting from a continued U.S. presence 
based on democratization has been the anger 
aroused in Iraqi and Afghani citizens. In-
stead of being greeted, as Vice President 
Richard Cheney predicted, as “liberators,” 
Coalition troops have been met with intense 
and overt hostility.  It is far outside the 
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 scope of this essay to discuss the 
legitimacy of this anger.  However, 
suffice to say that it exists, and it has 
a significant impact on how Iraq and 
Afghanistan have undergone democ-
ratic changes.  It should be noted that an-
ger is not necessarily just a negative ele-
ment in state building.  In fact, history has 
shown that anger can be used as a catalyst 
for regime change.  However, anger, particu-
larly when anger causes violence, makes the 
emergence of democratic institutions much 
less likely (Electing to Fight).  As the United 
States continues its stay in Iraq and Afghani-
stan on the grounds that a democratic state 
will eventually emerge, this anger is coun-
terproductive for achieving American objec-
tives.  
The emergence of religiously moti-
vated political parties and ethnic separatist 
movements must be considered regarding 
their impact on democratization.  Rather 
than address the specific goals of particular 
organizations, it is most useful to group 
them together when analyzing their impact 
on democratization efforts.   For example, 
while one group may want an Iraqi Sunni 
state while another may desire a free Kurs-
dish state, the most important aspect of these 
groups is that they all inhibit the ability of 
the US to engage in state-building, and have 
damaged Iraqi or Afghani conceptions of 
national unity.   
Although the amount of money and 
manpower spent on private contractors to 
rebuild Iraq and Afghanistan has been im-
mense, by far the United States military has 
played the largest role in reconstruction.  
Not only has the American military engaged 
in civil reconstruction, but its efforts to pro-
vide security to the two countries are indis-
pensible for the emergence of democratic 
states. Although there is no clear, universal  
answer as to precisely what is needed and in 
what order conditions need to emerge to cre-
ate democracy. Edward Mansfield and Jack 
Snyder (from whom my definition for de-
mocratization was taken) have written exten-
sively since 1995 regarding the ordering of 
democratic institutions necessary for democ-
racy to emerge. These two scholars argue in 
their book Electing to Fight that without the 
development of democratic institutions there 
can be no security, and thus, democracy, 
much less DPT, will not function.  Others 
may claim that without security there can be 
no democratic institutions, obviously inhibit-
ing democracy (Forman 2006, 196).  No 
matter which side of this chicken—egg de-
bate the reader falls, suffice to say that secu-
rity is an crucial element important part to 
the state building process. 
 Unfortunately, as mentioned earlier 
in this essay, terrorist attack methodology is 
remarkable for its simplicity, destructive ca-
pability and inability to be detected.  Thus, 
despite its superior weaponry and training, 
one of the greatest threats to the American 
military in Iraq and Afghanistan has been 
terrorist attacks. Roadside bombs and small 
arms fire are a constant problem for the 
American military, and the costs of carrying 
out these attacks as opposed to preventing 
them seriously favors the attacker over the 
victim (Howard 2009, 113). Thus, while the 
United States has pegged victory in the War 
on Terror on the emergence of democracy in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, it is attempting to cre-
ate democracy in an environment extremely 
hostile to the American presence.  
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 Now consider how all of this 
within the context of the emergence 
of religiously motivated political or-
ganizations and separatist movements 
on democratization.   These two types 
of organizations are considered linked in 
this essay because they share an important 
characteristic: they both tend to reject US 
involvement in state development.  In Iraq, 
separatist movements cannot support US 
efforts because, at present, the US is not at-
tempting to break up the Iraqi state.  Admit-
tedly, this is not always the case.  Until 
2006, prior to the Bush administration’s 
troop “surge” in which an additional 30,000 
troops were deployed to Iraq, the idea of a 
three state system was very possible.  This is 
exemplified by the January 2005 referendum 
in which Iraqis in the Northern Kurdish re-
gion voted for their independence from the 
rest of Iraq. (Galbraith 2006, 193) Even 
though the Kurds in Northern Iraq had been 
an invaluable asset to the United States dur-
ing the 2003 invasion, allowing the region to 
secede from the Iraqi state was an untenable 
solution for the Bush administration and the 
Maliki government.  To allow a portion of 
Iraq to remove itself from the negotiating 
table regarding Iraqi reconstruction could 
have opened the floodgates for secession by 
other groups. 
Afghanistan is in a different situa-
tion, but one no less hindered by separatist 
organizations.  To fully grasp the difference, 
it should be recognized that the American 
invasion in 2001 was done with significant 
assistance by native Afghanis.  The United 
Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghani-
stan (UFI, and known to Western media as 
the “Northern Alliance”) had worked exten-
sively with the United States and Great 
Britian during the 2001 invasion.  Immedi-
ately following the capture of Kabul, the 
UFI packed government positions with its 
cadres (Weinbaum 2006, 127). However, the 
ethnic composition of the North Alliance 
was such that it was dominated by Tajiks, 
Panjshiris, and Uzbeks; all relative minori-
ties in Afghanistan.  Absent from the alli-
ance, and thus, the new government, were 
Pashtuns and Shia Muslim Hazaras which 
were the largest groups in Afghanistan, but 
whose members resided in eastern and 
southern parts of the country.  As the Af-
ghan bureaucracy became occupied by 
Northern Alliance loyalists, warlords from 
southern and eastern Afghanistan began to 
see perceive the newly formed Afghan gov-
ernment as illegitimate (Weinbaum 2006, 
129).  Thus, while the United States con-
cerned itself with security in Afghanistan, 
the Afghan national government proved in-
effective at governing in areas much beyond 
Kabul.    
As for the specific dangers posed to 
democratization by religiously motivated 
political parties, distrust among Sunni and 
Shiites in Iraq almost caused a breakup of 
the state (Galbraith, 2006, 181-208). Iraqis 
Shiites, the majority Muslim faction in Iraq, 
had been the dominant force in drafting the 
Iraqi Constitution.  Of course, Shiite domi-
nance of the constitutional process was un-
acceptable to Sunni Iraqis who, with the De-
Baathification of the Iraqi government, had 
already begun to see democratization as a 
not-so-subtle effort to remove Sunnis from 
the governing process. Furthermore, at-
tempts by the Sunnis to take control of the 
government through democratic reform 
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 were viewed by many former 
Ba’athists as a threat to their power. 
This caused Sunni representatives to 
object to “nearly everything that was 
proposed,” (Galbraith 2006, 194) Sub-
sequent attempts by the United States by 
the United States to pacify Sunni dissent 
ostracized the Shiite majority who felt that 
America was not really interested in forming 
a genuine democracy.  Religious political 
parties were the logical outcome.  They 
acted a the perfect venue for Sunnis to ex-
tend their political control over the process.  
As a minority group, political power was at 
a premium of importance. 
With power concentrated in a few 
groups, and with the groups competing for 
power, sectarian violence erupted on a hor-
rific scale.  Sunni groups attacked Shiia 
groups and vice versa.  With each attack 
came retaliations.  Bigger attacks yielded 
bigger retaliation. The massive upswing in 
sectarian violence after the 2006 bombing of 
the al Askari Mosque is an excellent exam-
ple of the blood feud that consumed Iraq Re-
taliations were common.  It is believed that 
the bombing was the immediate cause of as 
many as 165 deaths, and most likely contrib-
uted to the upswing in violence that occurred 
for the months after the attack where aver-
age deaths per day rose from 11 to 34. 
(Galbraith 2006, 246) The violence was so 
prominent, a US intelligence reports released 
as late as August 2007 noted the disturbing 
frequency of sectarian violence as a major 
obstacle in establishing peace in Iraq. 
Essentially, the political motivated 
religious groups and the separatist move-
ments were fulfilling the gap in civil society 
generated by the destruction of the old re-
gimes.  Civil society is the lifeblood of de-
mocracy.  Ashutosh Varshney , a scholar on 
ethnic conflict and civic life, defines civil 
society as “the part of our life that exists be-
tween the state on one hand and families on 
the other that allows people to come together 
on a variety of issues (2002, 4).  Without the 
connections made through civil society, 
Varshney posits that the potential for vio-
lence in communities will increase. Al-
though Varshney wrote these words of wis-
dom regarding the relationships between 
Hindus and Muslims in India, the same 
statement could easily be applied to Sunnis, 
Shi’a and Kurds in Iraq, or Tajiks and Pash-
tuns in Afghanistan.  Without civil society 
there is violence, and as violence increases, 
the likelihood of democratization decreases. 
The Poppy Production Dilemma 
The inability to administer govern-
ance on the part of the Afghan national gov-
ernment has enabled a massive upswing in 
the production of poppy in parts of Afghani-
stan.  Afghanistan possess little arable land.  
Rocky, dry, and lacking even basic infra-
structures in some regions, it is very difficult 
for Afghan farmers to scratch out a living.  
Because of the inhospitable climate, Af-
ghan’s main agricultural products are limited 
essentially to the few things that can grow 
easily.  Among these are certain types of 
nuts, figs, and poppy.  Poppy, a plant from 
which opium cam be extracted, is used in the 
production of many types of narcotics such 
as heroin and morphine.  These drugs are 
intensely lucrative, and their production 
poses a serious concern for the fledgling Af-
ghani government.  Lawlessness and poor 
infrastructure makes the logistics of curtail-
ing the production of poppy very difficult.  
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 Nevertheless, the unmitigated pro-
duction of these goods can be very 
harmful.  Drugs production and sale 
are a problem for any government, par-
ticularly those with poor domestic sup-
port facilities (rehabilitation centers, pub-
lic health care clinics, etc.).  Furthermore, 
the sale of poppy has been linked to narco-
terrorism, and is a chief element in terrorist 
funding (Weinbaum 2006, 133).  Ironically, 
during the reign of the Taliban, poppy pro-
duction had been outlawed.  However, after 
the Northern Alliance came to power, and 
certainly after the Northern alliance lost the 
ability to administer government across Af-
ghanistan, poppy production has reached an 
all-time high (Weinbaum 2006, 126).  Thus, 
the United States and the newly formed Af-
ghan government finds itself in the tenuous 
position of both needing to stop the produc-
tion of a crop that can by synthesized into a 
controlled substance, and the need for farm-
ers to subsist.  The United States has placed 
itself in a no—win situation regarding poppy 
production.  If the United States destroys 
poppy crops to discourage narco-terrorism, it 
harms the wellbeing of Afghan farmers 
thereby decreasing the likelihood of the 
emergence of a middle class and harming 
democratization (Moore 1966, xxii). If the 
United States allows the poppy crops to 
grow, previous efforts to stabilize Afghani-
stan are undermined.  No matter what it 
does, America is hemorrhages resources. A 
continued American presence based on the 
emergence of a democratic state will only 
prolong the bleeding.  
Unending Investment 
 The central theme of this paper is 
how continued American presence in Iraq 
and Afghanistan in the name of democratiza-
tion has reduced the ability of the United 
States to wage the War on Terror.  A 
strained and previously engaged military, 
damaged American confidence in political 
leadership, and the accumulation of massive 
debt from invasion and reconstruction all 
reduced the ability of the United States to 
respond to future dangers. In this section, I 
will explore how and why these costs have 
accumulated.   
 Speaking in fiscal terms, the war has 
cost Americans a phenomenal sum of 
money.  In a Congressional report released 
October 15, 2008, Congress admitted to al-
locating almost one trillion dollars to fight-
ing the War on Terror (including all invasion 
and reconstruction activity in Afghanistan 
and Iraq) (United State Congress Congres-
sional Report Service 2008, 16).  This num-
ber is incredible.  It is almost one thirteenth 
of average annual American GDP 
(Purchasing Power Parity) in 2007 (World 
Bank, 2007).  Some critics of the War on 
Terror even claim this number is deflated.  
Joseph E. Stiglitz, a Nobel—prize winning 
economist, claims the costs of the war could 
actually be as high as $4 trillion 
(HERSZENHORN, 2008)  To appreciate 
these numbers, think of how this money was 
not used.  Even if the money was still only 
used to reduce the threat of terrorism, there 
were certainly other, better, uses for it.  By 
comparison, between 2003 and 2007, the 
United States Agency for International De-
velopment (USAID) received appropriations 
from Congress in the amount of $5 billion 
dollars (United States Congress. Congres-
sional Budget Office 2008, 3).  This is not to 
suggest that economic development is a 
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 suitable alternative from democra-
tization in the War on Terror.  How-
ever, by providing humanitarian assis-
tance, the United States might at least 
have reduced the animosity many in 
Iraq and Afghanistan feel towards the 
United States.  Had Iraq and Afghanistan 
turned into model democracies, these costs 
may have been bearable.  However, this has 
not been the case. 
 The United States military has also 
suffered as a result of its democratization 
efforts. The U.S. military is engaged in tasks 
for which it was not designed.  American 
soldiers predominantly trained for combat 
environments, not the sort of peacekeeping 
missions necessary for state building and 
reconstruction (Dobbins 2006, 223). As 
mentioned earlier, the US military did pos-
sess a few resources that would be helpful 
for democratization such as the Army Corps 
of Engineers for assistance in creating civil 
infrastructure.  However, these efforts have 
obviously proven insufficient.  The sheer 
quantity of money that has been spent on 
private contractors and by Nongovernmental 
organizations in Iraq and Afghanistan is a 
testament to this deficiency. 
 The credibility of American political 
elites has also suffered immensely because 
of the continued American presence in these 
two countries. In the immediate aftermath of 
9-11, President George Bush experienced 
record approval ratings; what many consid-
ered to be a manifestation of the “rally 
‘round the flag” effect (Muller 2005, 47).  In 
the run up to the war in Iraq, the Bush ad-
ministration received another spike in ap-
proval.  However, as the conflicts dragged 
on, as American expenses and casualties 
mounted, and as the amount of time neces-
sary for successful democratization became 
clearer, American public opinion waned.  A 
poll conducted by CBS asked 844 American 
adults nationwide, "Do you think the result 
of the war with Iraq was worth the loss of 
American life and other costs of attacking 
Iraq, or not?"  In August 2003, 46% of those 
surveyed said that they believed the costs 
were worth the results while 45% thought 
the costs were not worth it with 9% unsure 
(CBS News Poll, 2009).  In March of 2008, 
CBS polled the same group and discovered 
that according to their survey, support had 
gone down significantly.  In March 2008, 
only 29% of those surveyed though the costs 
were worth it while those who believed the 
results were not worth the costs rose to 64% 
of those surveyed with 7% unsure.  This 
negative sentiment was directly reflected in 
American views of President Bush.  In a 
Newsweek poll conducted by Princeton Sur-
vey Research Associates International asked 
1,003 adults nationwide, “. . . Do you ap-
prove or disapprove of the way Bush is han-
dling the situation in Iraq?"  In May 2003, 
less than one month after the initial invasion 
of Iraq, 69% of Americans said that they ap-
proved of the Bush administration’s han-
dling, while only 26% disapproved with 5% 
not sure.  In August 2005, over two years 
later, American views had obviously 
changed.  Again, Princeton Survey Research 
Associates International conducted the poll.  
This time, 34% of Americans approved, 
61% disapproved, and 5% were unsure.  At 
the end of the second Bush term, the same 
poll found 68% of Americans disapproved 
of Bush’s handling of Iraq (Newsweek Poll 
conducted by Princeton Survey Research 
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 Associates International, 2009).   
One popularly cited reason for why 
Americans stopped favoring the war 
and supporting American military lead-
ership is “casualty phobia”(Feaver 
Gelpi and Reifler 2009, 8).  This argu-
ment state argues that there may be initial 
support for the use of force, but the support 
evaporates rapidly and irrevocably at the 
sight of body bags.” (Feaver Gelpi and 
Reifler 2009, 8).  This certainly seems logi-
cal.  As the criteria for American victory in 
Iraq and Afghanistan was made unattainable, 
each life lost in the conflicts became more 
deplorable.  Obviously, as the United States 
prolongs its stay in Iraq and Afghanistan for 
the sake of democratization, it is likely that 
the credibility of political elites may suffer 
further damage. 
But what has enabled the hemorrhag-
ing of American dollars, lives, and domestic 
credibility in the name of democratization?  
The answer lies in the epistemological ambi-
guity of important terms in the War on Ter-
ror.  Few American politicians stood against 
the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001.  To do 
so would have been political suicide in a de-
mocratic society.  Similarly, in the weeks 
leading to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, few 
politicians stood against the Bush admini-
stration.  The stakes for being wrong were 
simply perceived as too high by most politi-
cians (Ravi 2005, 55).  Because of this uni-
form political support, the Bush administra-
tion introduced a number of terms into the 
discussion of the War on Terror.  Two of the 
most important terms for this discussion 
were “victory” and “democracy.”  On May 
2, 2003, U.S. President George Bush landed 
in full fighter regalia on the deck of the 
U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln.  The purpose of 
President Bush’s visit to the Abraham Lin-
coln was to declare as the banner behind him 
said, Iraq was “Mission Accomplished.”  As 
is now known all too well, the mission was 
not yet finished. Nevertheless, the Bush ad-
ministration made wining military cam-
paigns against Iraq seem like the only crite-
ria for a successful invasion (Ravi 2005, 45).  
However, when weapons inspectors con-
cluded Iraq never possessed a WMD pro-
gram, the Bush administration changed 
“victory” again.  This time, victory took the 
current definition of a fully democratic Iraq. 
Of course, there no explanation was ever 
provided about exactly what a fully democ-
ratic Iraq meant.  Internationally accepted 
free and fair elections? High voter registra-
tion and participation?  The Bush admini-
stration never explained. Despite this ambi-
guity, in a November 30, 2005 address 
where he discussed strategy for the war in 
Iraq, George Bush used the term “victory” 
15 times, and even posed a sign that said, 
“Plan for Victory” next to his podium 
(Berinsky Drukman, 2007, 128) Even 
though the definition for victory had 
changed, it was clear that the Bush admini-
stration still expected it.  On a similar note, 
the Bush administration remained steadfast 
against the use of timetables for withdrawal 
from the two countries, and because of its 
precarious position, was unable to ensure the 
developing Iraqi government reached Wash-
ington-approved checkpoints.  When Af-
ghanistan’s parliamentary elections were 
postponed from 2004 until 2005, the United 
States could only watch (United Nations In-
formation Service 2005).  Removing support 
for the nascent Afghani national  
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 government would not have 
yielded faster democratization.  All 
that the United States could do was 
keep promoting security in Afghanistan 
and hope for better election conditions 
in 2005. 
Unfriendly Friends 
The Bush administration did a spectacular 
job of alienating U.S. allies throughout the 
War on Terror.  Immediately following 9-11, 
nations around the world flocked to Amer-
ica’s support.  From long time allies like 
Britain to countries with which the U.S. has 
had cooler relations such as Iran and Libya, 
international solidarity against the hijackings 
was astounding.  Immediately after the at-
tack, the nineteen members of NATO in-
voked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty 
stating, that “an armed attack against one or 
more of them in Europe or North America 
shall be considered an attack against them 
all.”  The members of NATO went even fur-
ther by pledging action including the “use of 
armed force.” (Gordon 2002, 5)  However, 
two and a half years later, in the weeks lead-
ing up to the United States invasion of Iraq, 
relations between the United States and its 
allies soured. 
 Prior to the war, the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the 
United Nations Monitoring, Verification, 
and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), 
had been investigating Iraq.  These organiza-
tions are international bodies charged with 
investigating countries possessing nuclear 
technology for their compliance with inter-
national law.  In the case of Iraq the IAEA 
and UNMOVIC were responsible for inves-
tigating Iraqi compliance with United Na-
tions Security Council Resolution 1441. 
Resolution 1441 offered Saddam Hussein a 
final opportunity to have Iraq comply with 
previous United Nations Security Council 
resolutions restricting Iraq’s possession of 
both a nuclear material and certain prohib-
ited armament in the wake of the 1991 Gulf 
War (The United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1441, 2009).  However, the in-
vestigation of Iraq was not fast enough for 
the Bush administration.  Citing Iraqi un-
willingness to allow inspectors into certain 
areas, the Bush administration claimed that 
Iraq was not fully disclosing its weapons 
program and was therefore in contravention 
of Resolution 1441 (Galbraith 2006, 102). 
The Resolution contained no specific trig-
gers for military action.  Nevertheless, U.S. 
representative to the United Nations John 
Negroponte did comment that, “If the Secu-
rity Council fails to act decisively in the 
event of a further Iraqi violation, this resolu-
tion does not constrain any member state 
from acting to defend itself against the threat 
posed by Iraq, or to enforce relevant UN 
resolutions and protect world peace secu-
rity.” It was Negroponte’s caveat that would 
later be used by the Bush administration as a 
justification for the Iraq invasion. 
 The international community was not 
supportive of U.S. military action in Iraq.  
Particularly after IAEA and UNMOVIC in-
vestigators presented evidence for Iraqi 
compliance to Resolution 1441, the interna-
tional community saw U.S. militarism as 
disconcerting (Wall, 125). Although the 
United States would claim that it assembled 
a “Coalition of the Willing” to support it 
during a war with Iraq, the coalition was 
strongly influenced by bribes and coercion 
by the United States (Anderson Bennis and 
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 Cavanagh 2003, 8—10).  Those 
countries that were not part of the 
“Coalition” were ostracized, in many 
cases by the American public itself. 
France in particular experienced Ameri-
can rancor through boycotts of French 
products, jokes focusing on French military 
cowardice, and even childish renaming of 
items that contained the word “French” (i.e. 
“french fries” became “freedom fries”).  
None of this is good for utilizing the interna-
tional goodwill created after 9-11.  For their 
part, “The French see a new aggressive 
strain of messianic universalism in U.S. pol-
icy, a willingness to impose democracy by 
use of the U.S. military.” which they see as 
deeply troubling (Wall 2004, 126). As the 
United States continues its presence in Iraq 
and Afghanistan because of a dedication to 
the emergence of democracy, this view is 
unlikely to change.  
 
Policy Prescriptions  
Given these grotesque realities, what 
steps should the Obama administration take 
to correct America’s course in fighting the 
War on Terror?  The answer to this is in 
three parts.  First, the United States must 
extricate itself from the politics of Iraq and 
Afghanistan as much as possible. Secondly, 
the US must reducing instances of overt hos-
tility towards Muslims within US military 
practices.  Finally, the Obama administration 
needs to work to heal relationships between 
the US and the international community 
while convincing the international commu-
nity to share the burden of state building 
when necessary. These three tactics will ad-
dress the major obstacles to the War on Ter-
ror that have arisen as a result of attempts by 
the United States to democratize Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  These recommendations are a 
start.  Had the Bush administration under-
taken these policies in the early days of the 
two invasions, it is unlikely that conditions 
would have degenerated as seriously as they 
have.  Thus, the impacts of these actions are 
likely to carry repercussions that may not 
have necessarily have occurred if imple-
mented sooner.  The above prescriptions are 
likely to encounter serious problems in im-
plementation.  However, “obstacles on the 
ground” must be addressed one way or an-
other if the United States seeks to correct its 
mistakes 
It is important to mention that as of 
this writing, the Obama administration has 
taken several significant steps towards many 
of these goals.  However, much more work 
is needed before the ill—effects of attempts 
to democratize Afghanistan and Iraq can be 
eradicated.  As President, Barack Hussein 
Obama (a Democrat, America’s first black 
President, and a man with Muslim family) is 
in a unique position to shape how the United 
States fights the War on Terror.  Now, the 
only question that remains is if he is up to 
the challenge.  
American removal from Iraqi and 
Afghani governance is critical.  Without this, 
all other measures to fix the problems gener-
ated by these democratizations may be fruit-
less.  At a basic level, governments must 
concern themselves with two things: legiti-
macy and sovereignty.  Lacking either of 
these things will result in the devolution of 
society into lawlessness.  Without sover-
eignty, governments are unable to control 
citizens. Without legitimacy, constant inter-
nal power struggles will make a unified 
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 government impossible. While its 
presence in Iraq and Afghanistan 
may assist in governmental sover-
eignty (the United States military has 
extensively trained local Afghanis and 
Iraqis in combat and security measures 
(Obama, 2009)) it has hindered governmen-
tal legitimacy in the process. With separatist 
groups and religiously motivated political 
groups jockeying for power, such chinks in 
legitimacy of the new governments with 
weak civil societies may be fatal.   
While it may not be feasible for the 
United States to quickly and completely di-
vorce itself from Iraq and Afghanistan, it can 
certainly start by removing itself from much 
of the politics of the two countries.  The 
Obama administration must develop a list of 
objectives the United States will pursue in 
these countries, and fulfill them at the dis-
cretion of the host governments.  Further-
more, these goals need to be apolitical and 
object goods for all Iraqis and Afghanis.  A 
good example of this is security.  Simultane-
ously, the United States must create a list of 
goals and it expects the Iraqi and Afghani 
governments to accomplish.  These goals 
must be reasonable and they also must be 
accompanied by reasonable timetables. De-
spite its weaknesses in fighting terrorism, 
the United States military is certainly more 
capable of upholding security than the infant 
governments.    Furthermore, if the United 
States enforces security everywhere equally, 
not just in areas that are friendly toward 
America, the potential for harming the legiti-
macy of indigenous governments may di-
minish. However, the Iraqi and Afghani gov-
ernments must work diligently towards de-
mocracy for American efforts to be fruitful. 
Interestingly, if this policy is undertaken, it 
is likely that American objectives and Iraqi 
and Afghani objectives may sync on a num-
ber of key issues.  Both the Iraq and United 
States governments want al Qaeda in Iraq 
(AQI) agents apprehended.  Working with 
the Iraqi government may be the best way to 
achieve this, while simultaneously making it 
more difficult for AQI to gain supporters 
who are against the US presence.  By creat-
ing delineating responsibilities and goals, 
the United States will be providing strong 
support to democratization, but in such a 
way that it will more likely result in a full 
democracy. 
A serious blunder of the Bush ad-
ministration was the impact of American 
counterterrorist activity on the perceptions 
of Muslims around the world.  The problem 
was so significant that one of the major fo-
cuses of President Obama’s first trip abroad 
was to assure the “Muslim world” that the 
United States, “is not and will never be at 
war with Islam” (Cooper, 2009). Of course, 
soundbites from President Obama may not 
be sufficient to outweigh Muslim antipathy.  
Overt targeting of Islam and Muslims in the 
War on Terror have scarred American rela-
tions with many Muslims (Pew Global Atti-
tudes Project, Pew Research Center, 2009).  
To correct its course, the United States must 
not allow further cause to those who think 
the United States is at war with Islam.  
Obama has made significant strides in this 
regard.  Closing the infamous American 
military base and prisoner detention center at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba is an excellent first 
step.  As discussed, intentionally removing 
the phrase “War on terror” from the lexicon 
of American foreign policy is another step 
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 in the right direction.  These efforts 
must be continued if the United 
States is ever to win back the public 
opinion of Muslims around the world. 
Finally, the United States must work 
to reintegrate the international community 
into the War on Terror. America had wide-
spread international support after 9-11. 
However, the costs of involvement to Amer-
ica combined with American pomposity 
have made it unlikely for other countries to 
volunteer in the War on Terror.  Contribut-
ing to this unease is the knowledge that 
Tony Blair, Prime Minister of Britain and 
chief supporter of the United States during 
the Iraqi Invasion, received so much domes-
tic backlash that he lost his position as PM. 
Similarly, politicians in countries like Aus-
tralia and Spain came to power with prom-
ises that they would remove their country 
from the Coalition.  This is obviously a 
problem for the United States which already 
supplies the majority of resources for the 
two conflicts.  President Obama’s charge 
will thus be twofold for reintegrating the in-
ternational community into the War on Ter-
ror. First, he will need to convince politi-
cians that they will not necessarily loose 
popular support just by assisting in the War.  
Second (although related), President Obama 
needs to impress upon the international com-
munity that fighting terrorists must be a con-
cern of every country.  If Barack Obama can 
get more countries in the world invested in 
the notion of preventing terrorist attacks, 
then proving that politicians will not lose 
domestic support will come naturally.  With-
out the international involvement in the War 
on Terror, costs to Americans will be much 
higher, and the likelihood for success will be 
much lower.    
Conclusion 
In this essay I have shown how de-
mocratization has harmed the ability of the 
United States to wage the War on Terror. 
Theoretically, democratization may have 
been the solution for rebuilding Iraq and Af-
ghanistan after the United States invaded. 
However, poor planning, and insufficient 
resources have stymied the emergence of 
democratic institutions in these two states.  
Despite this slowness in democratization, 
political elites have defined victory in these 
two countries as the emergence of fully de-
mocratic governments. This decision has 
angered many indigenous Iraqis and Af-
ghanis, necessitated enormous and continual 
resource investment from the United States, 
and has tarnished U.S. image internationally.  
Despite these issues, American policy can be 
corrected.  The Obama administration must 
work to differentiate the War on Terror from 
what many Muslims perceive as a “War on 
Islam.” Furthermore, the Obama administra-
tion must develop concrete criteria for vic-
tory and abide by those criteria for commit-
ting a judicious withdrawal from Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  Finally, the Obama admini-
stration must involve other countries in the 
War on Terror.  This is important both be-
cause it will enable the United States to de-
fer some of the expenses of the War on other 
countries, but also because the goals of the 
War on Terror are beneficial to all states.  
These tasks will be difficult to achieve, but 
not impossible. By halting America’s tire-
less commitment to democratization in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, in the long run, the United 
States will be in a much better position to 
wage the War on Terror.  
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